Cbrm Collective Agreement

The unions argue that the Minister`s letter of July 4, 1994 is not an “order” under Section 5 of the CBRM Act and that “post-May 5, 1994 workers” are not “surrogate workers” under Section 6 (8) of the Act. In particular, the unions point out that there is no reference in the Minister`s letter to Section 5, which appears on his face as a general political statement of refusal of consent under Section 6, paragraph 8. He has no demand, say the unions on “recruitments” that are not “replacements”. These workers, according to the unions, are subject to the provisions of their respective collective agreements. This agreement is within the guidelines of the current legislation, Bill C-63, nor does it sanction a “work pool” anyway. The third step with respect to this request for non-recourse is to determine the impact that the above conclusions will have on the future course of this proceeding before this “new panel”. In accordance with Nova Scotia`s approach to applications accepted by the Board of Directors through its adoption of the 30:08 Civil Procedure Rule, the new agency will be prepared to convene new hearings to hear additional evidence regarding PANS, CUPE and IAFF employees (with non-IAFF employees recruited by the City of Sydney on the basis of their agreement with IAFF). Since the Union has been described as `partisan` at this stage of the proceedings, the CBRM will then be obliged to present its case and the Union will then have the right to provide rebuttal evidence. However, the Chamber wishes to emphasize that, although the basis for determining certain substantive issues has been clarified by this request for non-suit, the broad powers of the Board of Directors under Section 31(5) of the Trade Union Act and Section 6 of Act C.B.M.M. may, as far as possible, , provide equitable solutions to all categories of workers and the employer.

, has yet to be exercised. Stage 2, which deals with the benefits of the non-suit application, can be divided into two sub-questions, one that is emphasized by law and the other that emphasizes the facts. The first is whether there is evidence of a ministerial order or a legal authority that would exclude the unions` assertions that the workers in issue are permanent employees and not sea employees. The second sub-question is that in the absence of a ministerial order or a legal power legally excluding the Union`s application, what is the evidence of the unions` allegations that they are permanent employees under their respective collective agreements who would protect their employment under the estate and not full-time workers whose employment ended on Or before 3 July. , 1995. Each of these issues is dealt with successively as part of the review of a non-recourse dismissal application, as described above. This contract is not part of a collective agreement and becomes redundant as of July 31, 1995. CBRM argues that this letter constitutes a “directive” under Section 5 of the Act, which excludes the employment of workers after May 5, 1994 beyond July 31, 1995. In addition, CBRM argues that Section 6(8) of the Act applies to many workers in dispute, who must be considered “replacements” recruited without ministerial agreement.

Indeed, there is no evidence of “ministerial consent” within the meaning of Section 6, paragraph 8, with respect to the workers in dispute. Indeed, the ministerial letter and section 6, paragraph 8, are sufficient power to exaggerate collective agreements that, in the present circumstances, might otherwise apply.

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